In postrevolutionary Tunisia, local 
the local level and outlined the many unintended consequences of macroreforms in the face of local resistance and adaptations. 3 Yet in all these cases, because bottom-up challenges to the existing institutional order were not sustained and powerful enough, these microdynamics were generally deprioritized in explanation of political stability in the country (and the region). Instead, the dominant consensus emerged that since authoritarian institutions and policies appeared to be gradually producing reasonably stable and predictable national environment, explanations of political causality in these countries ought to be grounded mainly on these known institutional actors and processes.
Today, in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, institutionalist approaches are once again becoming common, especially in relation to rebuilding state legitimacy and institutions. 4 While such focus on the state retains its relevance, particularly in situations of consolidation of routine political governance, it is crucial not to once again "over-state" the Arab state. Certainly, the literature considering the struggle between new and old elites seeking to maximize and consolidate their institutional power remains particularly appropriate in post-uprisings contexts. 5 Additionally, the practical and ideological struggle between Islamist and non-Islamist actors for control of state institutions is undoubtedly important, even though it is not necessarily the most relevant indicator of social and political change. 6 Equally, the role of security forces in these polities can be decisive, as we can see from their impact in the recent political reconfigurations of Libya and Egypt. 7 Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, today even more so than before the Arab uprisings, it remains crucial to make room for bottom-up political processes that work beneath, and sometime upset, these top-down institutional dynamics. In the following article, we seek to contribute to a better understanding of the grassroots and local dynamics of democratic transition by analyzing trends in the successes and failures of local democracy in Tunisia.
The Tunisian democratic transition, which started when President Zine El-'Abidine Ben 'Ali left power on January 14, 2011, was characterized by a reasonably smooth establishment of an electoral democracy, exemplified by the election of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) eight months later. By the end of that year, the formation of a coalition government -the Troika, led by the Islamist party, the Ennahda Movement (from al-nahda, "the revival") -marked the beginning of two years of political and institutional consolidation. Political polarization in the country became more intense in 2013 with the assassinations of two left-wing parliamentarians (Chokri Belaïd on February 6 and Mohamed Brahmi on July 25) by armed Islamists thought to be linked to the Salafi organization Ansar al-Shari'a (literally "Supporters of Shari'a;" the group was classified as a terrorist organization and banned shortly after the second assassination). Tensions between Islamist and secularist politicians, led by the Nidaa Tounes party (properly Nida' Tunis; "the call of Tunisia"), led to parliamentary boycotts and extraparliamentary protests that hindered the passing of a new constitution and the scheduling of new parliamentary elections. However, in January 2014, the Ennahda-led government formally handed over executive power to a technocratic government that was to govern until the next election, scheduled for the end of that year. This agreement facilitated a return to parliamentary routine and the passing of a new constitution by the NCA. This political pragmatism enabled the country to move relatively unhindered toward new elections in 2014: for parliament, on October 26; for the presidency, November 23; and a presidential runoff on December 21.
For Tunisia, as for most of the region, while there is some degree of scholarly consensus regarding the most relevant state actors and processes that shape contemporary political changes, no such agreement is readily available regarding the most pertinent grassroots dynamics. 8 Although many analysts have focused in recent months on the struggles in Tunisian high politics -over a new constitution, the nomination of a technocratic government, parliamentary elections, and the formation of a new ruling coalition -much of the bottom-up dynamics that fed into these processes remained largely overlooked. 9 Hence, in our analysis, we investigate the political dynamics that could gain momentum at the local level when an authoritarian system, like that of Ben 'Ali's, is overthrown and replaced by a new and more democratic system. What were the implications of the fears voiced by the Tunisian opposition that the Islamists would attempt to play a new hegemonic role and exclude them from power? Conversely, to what extent were Ennahda supporters correct to blame many of their difficulties of governance on the continuing presence of a "deep state" that purposely created hindrances for the new regime? The following analysis highlights the role of the local strategies and their unintended consequences in shaping a municipal political landscape that both facilitates and hinders the democratic transition implemented by national institutions.
In this article, we examine the reconstruction of local politics and institutions in a few Tunisian municipalities with diverse social and political constituencies. We analyze how a new set of processes and actors takes root locally and interacts with the democratic transformation of the political institutions and state administration. We detail how the initial re-empowerment of local politics as a form of direct democracy -i.e., the bottom-up "revolutionary" process of replacing personnel and rules from the old regime with local ones -evolved into an ambiguous form of representative democracy. During the time of this study, this ambiguity derives from the fact that during the first four years of Tunisia's transition, representative democracy was not directly applicable to local politics, as no local elections were held. 10 In this context, we investigate how the political interactions between the center and the periphery shaped, and were shaped by local actors and processes that had different types of claims to democratic legitimacy. A better understanding of these different forms of legitimacy constitutes an important element in explaining the contemporary Tunisian democratic transition.
To highlight how local politics were shaped by local actors, we focus our analysis on municipalities located in a single governorate. Although we have found similar local dynamics to the ones examined here in other governorates, 11 we chose to reduce the variability introduced by gubernatorial and parliamentary actors by ensuring that one governor dealt with all the municipalities investigated and that, after the 2011 parliamentary elections, only one set of parliamentarians was involved (as parliamentary circumscriptions correspond to governorates). We chose the governorate of Ariana as it contains municipalities with visibly different levels of socioeconomic development in close proximity. Within the governorate, we focused primarily on the municipalities of Ariana and Ettadhamen, with additional insights provided by looking at the municipality of Raoued. Ariana is a relatively well-off neighborhood of Greater Tunis with a long tradition of social and political activism. Meanwhile Ettadhamen is a poorer area primarily developed in the 1970s through the improvement of shantytowns and the 10. At the time of publication, municipal elections are scheduled for March 26, 2017. The Higher Independent Authority for Elections (al-Hay'a al-'Ulya al-Mustaqilla li-l-Intikhabat, or Instance supérieure indépendante pour les élections, hence ISIE) started working with local authorities in October 2015 in order to devise the new system of electoral laws. " Table ronde building of new social housing. Illustrative of these differences, Ariana's unemployment rate was about half of Ettadhamen's in the 2000s and the number of its inhabitants with formal education three times higher.
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In the first section, we detail how these three municipalities during the Ben 'Ali period were instrumentalized by the regime for political ends and characterized by a functioning, top-down state administration. In the second section, we illustrate how the early revolutionary period constituted an experiment with democracy, in which citizens and previously excluded social and political social actors learned about political governance and tried to institutionalize the choices made during the revolution. In the third section, we show how the absence of an electoral process at the local level was a substantive cause of friction between the bottom-up revolutionary process of popular empowerment and the top-down formal process of political democratization. In the fourth and final section, we indicate how the erosion of state authority in municipalities is tied to the erosion of local political legitimacy, as tensions between politicians, civil servants, and citizens weaken the ability of the state to act effectively and representatively.
THE OLD REGIME AND ITS LOCAL LEGACIES
In this section, we introduce the structure and rationale of the local political and administrative order under Ben 'Ali. We note the linkages between the administrative aspects of governance and the political logics of regime survival. We also indicate the limitations of the reforms of the 2000s and the political tensions that became more visible at the local level. The relevance of the "local" in forming public opinion is grounded on people's everyday experiences with the local interfaces of national institutions. Regarding state authority, it is also directly connected to the way in which state power is devolved and organized locally.
Local opposition activist Khaled 'Amami suggested that for ordinary Tunisians, Ben 'Ali's governance system appeared to be built from the bottom up with the 'umda (district chief) at the lowest level of an extensive hierarchical administrative structure that went all the way up to the Ministry of the Interior. 13 Much of this structure remains even after the revolution. The 'umda is the representative of the state administration at the level of the sector ('imada), which can be either a neighborhood or a rural district. In the Ben 'Ali system, besides his administrative function, the 'umda played a political role and was the face of the regime for most ordinary Tunisians. The 'umda's power was largely the product of a patronage network in which he had a strategic role in evaluating the socioeconomic needs of the locals and in directing the flow of state benefits toward "deserving" individuals and families. Discretionary financial support was most relevant for the poorest citizens, and although this system did not directly address the issue of poverty, it gave the state administration an additional tool of social control. 14 As scholars from Stephen J. King to Béatrice Hibou show, despite having a low status in the administrative machinery, an 'umda had significant influence over the life of ordinary citizens. 15 On the upper levels of the administrative and political ladder, even today, are functionaries from the delegation (mu'tamadiyya) and the governorate (wilaya). 16 The regional governor (wali) is at the nexus between the central administration and the local or regional administrative and political structure. These key civil servants regulating interactions between the center and the periphery are appointed by the interior minister and, before the revolution, governors' nominations were overseen by Ben 'Ali himself. The other relevant institutional nexus at the local level are the decentralized structures of the different ministries. Under Ben 'Ali, beyond purely local matters, the principal way in which ordinary citizens would engage with the central state bureaucracy was via the ministries' regional or provincial headquarters. 17 As explained by an 'umda in Ettadhamen, this system was structured by the patronage network of Ben 'Ali's party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally (al-Tajammu' al-Dusturi al-Dimuqrati; known in French as the Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique, thus the acronym RCD), and citizens in need of a "service" from the administration usually needed the help of a local facilitator. 18 This task was usually performed by a delegate (mu'tamad). While delegates were technically in charge of coordinating actions between different local sections of national administrations, they were simply those whom most Tunisians would approach to obtain various permits from the central bureaucracy.
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In the 1990s, the municipal system that Tunisia inherited from the Ottoman and French period was reformed, principally in response to external pressure for political democratization and administrative decentralization. 20 Under the jurisdiction of the delegations, Tunisia's 264 municipalities (baladiyyat) deal with matters such as building and maintaining primary schools, sports facilities, cemeteries, and public gardens, as well as roads improvements, garbage collection, and some aspects of building regulations. Each municipality has an elected local council and is headed by a mayor who 14 is one of the local councillors selected by and from among his peers. In the 1990s, municipalities were given additional prerogatives and a degree of financial autonomy via local tax collection, as well as a compensation fund for the poorest municipalities that could not rely entirely on taxation. In our case studies, while the Ariana municipality was largely financially autonomous, that of Ettadhamen was mostly subsidized by the central government through various funds and administrative bodies (see Figure I ). It is thus highly questionable whether this process of decentralization worked in the sense of creating a local democracy or even greater public accountability of the local institutions. In the 2000s, analyses of the role of such state reforms promoting "good governance" and "local development" in the country commonly present this process as part of a general upgrading of authoritarianism. 21 Nonetheless, these developments did provide a new formal structure of participation for local actors and ordinary citizens that would become relevant after the 2011 revolution. The limited significance of these reforms was visible in the final years of the Ben 'Ali regime through the occasional episodes of contestation that took place in several localities. The most important and best known of these episodes of local unrest was the 2008 protests in the Gafsa mining region. Protesting nepotism in hiring by the stateowned Gafsa Phosphate Company, unemployed workers showed some of the limitations of the patronage system and repressive tactics of the regime. Due to the mining industry's significance in the region, the initial protest snowballed to include most of the local population. Eventually, the carrot-and-stick approach of the regime --dismissal of the governor and the company director, followed by a new round of hiring on the one hand, and an increase in arrests and imprisonments of protesters on the other --ensured a return to normality. 22 Similar difficulties in translating national policies into the local context led to several days of rioting in the border town of Ben Gardane in August 2010. In this case, it was the regime's attempt to clamp down on the smuggling of cheap products transiting through Libya that led to closing the border crossing. This situation dramatically affected a local economy primarily based on legal and illegal commercial exchanges with Libya and generated violent protests. Finally, that same year, small landowners in the town of Regueb (including members of the extended family of Muhammad Bou'azizi, whose self-immolation a few months later in nearby Sidi Bouzid sparked the protests that led to the ouster of Ben 'Ali) organized a protest against the National Agricultural Bank to oppose its efforts to expedite repossessing land when owners were late on loan payments. 23 After the fall of the regime, many of the local tensions that had been expressed in the final years of Ben 'Ali quickly resurfaced during an intense period of social unrest. 24 In the public administration, this period was an opportunity to settle accounts with multiple "petty dictators," usually RCD members or their associates, who had been in charge until then. It was no great surprise that most of the RCD-dominated local councils suddenly stopped holding meetings, and their most prominent members disappeared from view, whether of their own accord or because they were driven out by protesters. In turn, the situation generated new dilemmas, particularly in relation to the management of the municipalities: who was meant to do what, on what grounds, and in whose name? In the early stages of the Tunisian transition, the road map proposed by the new provisional government of Prime Minister Béji Caïd Essebsi focused on introducing new electoral laws and bodies to supervise national elections in order to meet both domestic and international expectations. Yet, this roadmap to the election of the National Constituent Assembly ignored, or at best treated very superficially, the issue of local democracy. National leaders appeared to deprioritize the issue of the legitimacy of the new local councils and of their relevance in ensuring good local governance in the post-Ben 'Ali era. 25 In the following, therefore, we consider how new local actors in some of these municipalities managed the institutional and administrative infrastructure left behind by the old regime, and to what effect.
THE BATTLE FOR THE LOCAL RECONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY
In the following section, we highlight the variety of actors who came to the forefront during the uprisings, and how they dealt with the existing political and administrative order so they could rebuild local forms of authority. We examine the evolution of these ad hoc arrangements, centering on the local councils between the time of the revolution and the parliamentary elections of October 2011, which illustrates how different social and political actors compromised in ways that reflected their movements' varied strengths at the local level. In particular, we highlight two different stages in the transitional process. First is the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Ben 'Ali regime, which was characterized by the emergence of many social and political forces, including "old" civil society actors (unions, human right associations, leftist organizations, and established opposition politicians) and new civil society actors (Ennahda activists, Salafis, and "revolutionary leagues"). Second, after a few weeks or months of unrest, a process of re-institutionalization of political authority occurred, during which some of these emergent actors were able to stabilize and consolidate their positions in local politics. In this context, we note how successful actors tended to be characterized by a greater professionalization of their role, a mobilization of local resources, and an effective dialogue with the state administration.
While the 2011 uprisings disrupted the routine mechanisms of authoritarian governance and induced a change of elites at the top, the crisis's ramifications throughout state institutions were less clear-cut, even as new elites set out to democratize the system. 26 Typically, in situations of multiple sovereignties characteristic of revolutionary episodes, the disorganization of the old regime's security apparatus constitutes one important factor of change. Shortly after Ben 'Ali fled the country, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi obtained the support of key opposition actors, such as the powerful Tunisian General Labor Union (al-Ittihad al-'Amm li-l-Shughl, or Union générale des travailleurs tunisiens and hence UGTT) to head the provisional government after fully embracing the discourse of democratic transition. Soon afterwards, ministers from the provisional government started saying in televised interviews that citizens were right to protect their neighborhoods against counterrevolutionary forces (allegedly the presidential guard, the RCD activists, and various other "agitators"). This situation reinforced a dynamic of local mobilization for defensive purposes rather than against the regime. This shift in emphasis, which implied trying to insulate the local community from harmful external influences, would have long-lasting consequences for local politics.
Locally, as groups of people organized themselves to protect and manage their neighborhoods, various committees and "leagues for the protection of the revolution" began to take shape. It is worth noting that while many of these bodies would continue to function well after the election of the NCA, their internal organization and sociological makeup, as well as their ideological orientation and their practices, would significantly evolve over time. In the weeks that followed the fall of the regime, local actors that took over power from the police forces, administration, and RCD networks in the neighborhoods were usually established political or social opposition actors who had previously been tolerated to some degree by the regime. 27 The most institutionalized actors included UGTT cadres, as well as civil liberties activists linked to the Tunisian League of Human Rights, the Bar Association, the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women, and other organizations. 28 While these "official" local actors structured formal and informal institutional relations during the transitional process, they were not necessarily the ones who had led the antiregime protests up to that point. They too had been surprised by the sudden mobilization of a crowd of previously "depoliticized" youths against the regime, a motley crew of young revolutionaries who would soon be blaming these institutionalized actors and the politicians for stealing "their revolution." 29 Local dynamics in the postrevolutionary period thus varied enormously from place to place, depending on the composition of established civil society actors in each locality, and on the relation between "old" and "new" activists. In our case study, these variations were clearly visible between the different municipalities of Ariana Governorate. In particular, in the relatively well-off Ariana municipality, politics and associative life was dominated by a traditional "bourgeoisie" structured along secular and liberal tendencies (from the left and from the right). 30 As actors from an established middle class and often secularized civil society were well implanted before the revolution, they "naturally" led the process of transition locally after the revolution since they had experience in dealing with the central administration. In the more impoverished Ettadhamen municipality, by contrast, such established local actors were less prevalent and lower-middle class and working class people tended to endorse mainly representatives from the Ennahda Movement and the revolutionary leagues as leaders of the local community.
In the Ariana municipality, the role played by Tarek Chaabouni, a former opposition legislator in the Ben 'Ali-era parliament, exemplifies the dynamics between established civil society actors in the postrevolutionary period. When he saw that the city council was no longer convening, Chaabouni wrote to the local governor at the end of February 2011 to ask him to nominate a new council. 31 In response, the governor began to contact several established opposition activists in Ariana Governorate in order to organize a meeting between himself, as a representative of the new state authorities, and local community representatives. Soon afterwards, a new council was nominated that was led by the area UGTT branch's general secretary and local leaders of former opposition parties that had been sanctioned under Ben 'Ali. 32 Other city councils were subsequently appointed throughout the governorate at rates that reflected the ease with which the governor could find coalitions of local activists willing and able to endorse the appointments. As time passed by and the enthusiasm for revolutionary politics (or for politics altogether) diminished, professional politicians associated with political parties and social actors with organizational support (i.e., unions and businesses) became more prominent in local governance.
Although city councils were appointed in a similar fashion in several Ariana Govenorate municipalities, such as Ettadhamen and Raoued, the outcomes of this process were not so straightforward. 33 In these localities, the local "representatives" identified by the governor among established civil society actors and nominated to govern the municipalities were far less prominent on the local scene. The legitimacy and authority of these nominated councillors, especially those from secular, liberal, or leftist organizations, were quickly challenged by other local activists, especially Islamists, who had a stronger local following than these "official" civil society actors. 34 Soon enough, activists interpreted this competition at the local level according to the political battle lines drawn at the national level.
In Ettadhamen, one leftist activist articulated how many on the Left perceived that the local league of protection of the revolution was being "used by Ennahda" to impose the Islamist movement's preferred candidates in local politics. 35 By contrast, a local Ennahda councillor explained such tensions by arguing that there were relationships between these secularized civil society actors and the old regime, and that those links were used by the remnants of the old regime to resist change. 36 Therefore, in these contested municipalities, the reestablishment of political authority and administrative governance was directly influenced by these local power struggles.
In Raoued, after eight months of sit-ins by the local revolutionary league in front of the city council, an agreement was finally reached when 9 of the 24 council seats were allotted to local Ennahda members. 37 In Ettadhamen, where Islamist activists were more prominent, the city council was "conquered" in August 2011, after several large demonstrations and sit-ins. The mayor, who had been appointed in March, was forced to resign. After the parliamentary elections and the nomination of the Ennahdaled government, the new Ariana governor accepted the Islamists' seizing of power in Ettadhamen as a fait accompli. 38 In all these cases, Ennahda sought to position themselves as the professional politicians best able to represent all Islamic-minded social actors and citizens, from Salafis to the "Islamic bourgeoisie." These local dynamics often followed the evolution of the state-level process of democratic transition. Many leftist and liberal activists in the municipalities studied recall that at the beginning of the transition process, before the NCA elections, Ennahda activists were very discreet regarding their affiliation with the Islamist group. This initial situation reflected a lack of local implantation after years of intense state repression against Islamists. Local councillor and Raoued deputy mayor Fathi 'Ayari noted that at that time, most Ennahda cadres were "coming back from abroad, looking for houses to live in, or trying to find a place for the party's local headquarters." 39 In that context, many of the political and civil society associations that were active throughout the 2000s, albeit under strict state supervision, could more easily provide local leadership than could Ennahda members. However, returning or new Ennahda activists -just like the Salafis of Ansar al-Shari'a and the revolutionary committee -were able to make up for lost ground in those poorer neighborhoods, small provincial towns, and rural areas without a dense network of established associations. 40 
MANAGING RELATIONS BETWEEN LOCAL POWERS AND THE NEW REGIME
In this section, we highlight the different political and administrative dynamics that came into place after the October 2011 parliamentary elections and the formation of the Ennahda-led government in order to manage the exceptional situation created by nonelected local councils. In particular, we illustrate how the overall administrative structure and decision-making channels of postrevolutionary Tunisia remained the same as before but were backed by a new form of political legitimacy and reflected a new political orientation in national (and local) politics. In this context, we examine new local power struggles between pro-and anti-Islamist actors, as well as their outcomes in different municipalities when state actors with formal democratic legitimacy reemerged in local politics. In particular, we highlight how, after the elections, the new Tunisian regime sought to rebalance the political forces that controlled local councils through a combination of political and administrative pressures.
In March 2011, the provisional government formally raised the issue of the mu- nicipalities for the first time. 41 Following the massive protests in Kasbah Square in Tunis that led to the resignation of Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, the new provisional government under Béji Caïd Essebsi quickly elaborated a road map to take the country to the elections for the constituent assembly. Meanwhile, the government decided to resolve the power vacuum left in the local political and administrative system by using the existing organic law of the municipalities. The law stipulated that in extraordinary circumstances, local councils could be replaced by "special delegations" (niyabat khususiyya, or délégations spéciales) appointed by decree of the interior minister. 42 Under Ben 'Ali, this proviso had mainly been invoked to bypass councils that showed too much independentmindedness or were reluctant to implement directives from the central administration. In the postrevolutionary context, this law was used to enshrine the authority of the newly nominated councils that, as "special delegations," could substitute themselves for the Ben 'Ali-era elected councils for a duration of one year. While it was previously a process that was meant to impose the choices of the center over the periphery --the Interior Ministry, via the governor, always had the last word in discussions with local actors --this relationship became far more balanced in the aftermath of the revolution.
One of the main arguments advanced here is that a main substantive cause of friction between the bottom-up revolutionary process of popular empowerment and the top-down formal process of political democratization was the absence of an electoral process at the local level. The issue of whether to start the process of political transition by organizing local elections before parliamentary ones briefly surfaced after the nomination of the Essebsi government, but it did not gather momentum. 43 The question of the organization of local elections returned after the October 2011 NCA election. However, the assembly decided that a new electoral law needed to be in place before organizing the next local and parliamentary elections. As this was unlikely to happen before the expiration of the one-year statutory period for the special delegations, new procedures were introduced as part of the "petite constitution" to remove this time limitation. Article 21 of Constitutional Law 6/2011 of December 16, 2011, also gave power to the prime minister to dissolve and to appoint new municipal councils after a consultation with the president of the republic, the NCA president, deputies from the relevant constituencies, and local municipal actors.
These choices reflected a new political situation in which the NCA was the only democratically elected institution in post-Ben 'Ali Tunisia. By implication, it signified to the local councillors that they had to heed this new distribution of democratic legitimacy, evidenced by the number of parliamentarians from different parties in each electoral constituency. Yet, without local elections, neither political competition nor agreements between national political elites could be directly duplicated at the local level. Local politics were about balancing the competing interests and agendas of the activists, who first took charge of the municipalities in the aftermath of the revolution because of their more structured presence on the ground, and those who acquired legitimacy after the parliamentary elections. Thus, while ideological struggles between Islamists and secularists over the new constitutional order were the main nationwide battleground of Tunisia's democratic transition in 2013, an important though unspectacular war of attrition was also being fought in local politics to infuse local administrative and political systems with a particular set of ideas and practices of governance. In particular, opposition actors began to fear the way Ennahda and its allies were increasingly controlling the local political and administrative system so as to shape everyday opportunities and expectations of citizens in ways that resembled what the previous authoritarian regime had been doing for years. In the months that followed the end of the Ben 'Ali regime, the establishment of special delegations in the municipalities more often than not merely validated a de facto situation of control by various groups of local activists. The initial impulse to reorganize political and administrative authority in municipalities came initially from the bottom up, but as the newly elected legislature reasserted its powers, the authoritarianera institutional apparatus regained its ability to shape local politics (not least because governors retained most of their prerogatives toward municipalities). This situation acquired a new political significance after the formation of the Ennahda-led government at the end of 2011, as the Islamists were nominating governors sympathetic to their cause in order to control the political and administrative system. 44 In Ariana Governorate, after the parliamentary elections, the governor and the newly elected Ennahda parliamentarians from the circumscription put pressure on the local councils that did not have a strong Ennahda presence to change their composition to reflect the Islamists' electoral success. In the municipality of Ariana, they faced strong opposition from the other social and political actors who were still well mobilized and organized. As Rafik Khanfir, a local councillor at the time, noted, "Ennahda tried to renegotiate its political influence and the political balance within the city council due to the electoral results in the circumscriptions. However they did not succeed in gaining more influence in the Ariana council."
45 By contrast, in the neighboring Raoued municipality where opposition actors were less effectively mobilized, Deputy Mayor 'Ayari indicated that "the governor started negotiations in order to renew our city council, and so 9 councillors of 24 came from Ennadha, as an inevitable consequence of what happened in the national elections." 46 Finally, in the municipality of Etthadamen, as Ennahda and its allies were already controlling the council, no changes were introduced. In all these cases, the reassertion of the power of the central authorities thus maintained a tension (albeit a manageable one) between elected national politicians and actors in the local councils.
ELECTORAL LEGITIMACY, (BAD) GOVERNANCE, AND (SITES OF) RESISTANCE
In the following, we outline how the erosion of political authority at the local level is linked to the absence of formal, electoral legitimacy underpinning the actions of the city councils. We indicate how in this extraordinary situation, local political actors cannot easily command the obedience of civil servants or the compliance of the population. We illustrate how the conflicting demands placed on local actors can generate paralysis and by 44 extension undermine the overall authority and capabilities of the state. In addition, in the context of political transition, the tensions between central government, local political authorities, and the administration are commonly instrumentalized to make political gains.
The main practical difficulties that local political actors faced when they took control of the municipalities were very limited logistical capabilities and a scarcity of financial resources. Probably the most visible local predicament in the months that followed the revolution was the mountains of trash that accumulated on the streets. For many Tunisians, it was a testimony to the many problems of postrevolutionary governance in the country. As many municipal garbage collection trucks had been destroyed during the uprising, pickup could often no longer be organized. 47 After the revolution, it also became far more difficult for the councils to finance municipalities' activities through tax collection, as many citizens decided they would not pay inefficient and illegitimate local authorities. In the postrevolutionary situation, local governance was also hampered because the local police could not always be relied upon to follow the directives from the council. As Raoued deputy mayor 'Ayari remarked, "we always had some difficulties in collecting taxes, but after 2011, the situation got even worse. … The municipal police began to refuse to obey us, and the municipality could not rely on their support anymore and could not collect taxes as much as before." 48 In this difficult context, local police officers, like many other local civil servants, weighed the requirements to support local authorities with limited legitimacy against the risk of popular resentment (or even violence) against them. 49 Visible breakdowns of state authority were thus particularly notable in relation to the growth of black market activities and the boom in illegal residential construction. With limited means at their disposal to reestablish their authority, local councils often had to cave in to high social demands for change. Mohammed Khemissi Cherni, the head of Ennahda's party committee on local authorities, stressed that many local councils chose to turn a blind eye to this phenomenon as resentment against the Ben 'Ali system was particularly acute in those areas. For example, previously, only good patronage connections could deliver a building permit. As Cherni lamented, however, overall "this way of acting gives the impression that the country is in a state of anarchy." 50 During the transitional period in the municipalities, local needs were met primarily due to the local institutions' and political elites' weaknesses. Unsurprisingly, by 2013, this continuing lack of (good) governance at the local level was beginning to reflect poorly on Ennahda's ruling coalition.
At that time, poor management and failure to meet expectations in municipalities damaged the authority of local and national political actors far more than ideological divergences. This poor management was in no small degree linked to the councils' lack of electoral legitimacy. Routinely, their decisions were opposed internally by civil servants unwilling to follow instructions that could land them into trouble and opposed externally by local activists and citizens with different views or claims. As a result, as the director of the environment department of the Ariana municipality Lotfi Dachraoui remarked, "the mayor and important members of many councils (including Ariana) who still fear ordinary citizens and the 'dégage, dégage' attitude [i.e., referring to a revolutionary slogan meaning for the leaders to 'get out'], prefer not to take clear-cut, significant political decisions." 51 Although local actors commonly recognized that most of these problems were local, opposition activists and even civil servants were quick to point out that this also more generally illustrated Ennahda's lack of competence.
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In this context, the Ennahda local representatives faced increased difficulty in convincing the population that they were managing their affairs efficiently, especially at a time when the party faced strong parliamentary opposition and street protests at the national level.
In practice, the Essebsi transitional government (2011), the Ennahda-led government (2012-13), and the technocratic government led by Mehdi Jomaa (2014) all share responsibility in the continued erosion of political authority at the local level. By deprioritizing local elections, national politicians ensured that the contested legitimacy of the councils --ad hoc local constructs, nominated special delegations, or a mixture of both --continued to reduce the efficiency of the local actors as a transmission belt for national polities. In addition, new nominations in the local and provincial administrations (i.e., for governor, delegate, and 'umda) to replace the most visible agents of the Ben 'Ali system may have been expedient to entrench the authority of the new regime, but it also gave the impression in the local constituencies that the new elites were instrumentalizing the political and administrative system to set up their own patronage networks. Local activist Khaled 'Amami indicated that many ordinary Tunisians felt that the Ennahda offices or those of the revolutionary leagues were then the places to visit to obtain a favor from the state administration. 53 The dysfunctional nature of the postrevolutionary Tunisian state in this local context can thus be generally explained by the combination of three sets of factors. First, failure to meet expectations in the postrevolutionary period had much to do with the behavior of citizens themselves, who kept challenging the rules and taking the law into their own hands. Second, the councils' limited legitimacy combined with their limited resources and support from the state administration ensured that local political actors were often unable or unwilling to act decisively in the face of conflicting social demands. Third, national politicians sought to reorganize local political and administrative hierarchies according to their ideologies and interests right after the revolution, which created frictions that undermined the efficiency of the new system. Citizens who had expected a rapid change in their material condition were disappointed by what they saw generically as "bad" governance. By 2014, this perception was one of the main reasons underpinning the growing success of the anti-Ennahda opposition.
CONCLUSION
As the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections ushered Tunisia toward a period of democratic consolidation, what lessons could be learned from local processes of political reconstruction during the transitional period? In analyzing the interactions 51. Interview by Loschi with Lotfi Dachraoui, May 2014, Ariana. 52. For example, although Dachraoui assessed that municipalities' inability to deal with the garbage crisis had been caused by damage done by locals to the councils' equipment, the issue was deemed to be a national predicament and so the government was blamed for the failure to resolve the crisis.
53. Interview, Khaled 'Amami, Dec. 2012, Tunis.
between citizens, local actors, and administrative structures, we provide a glimpse of the political dynamics that commonly remain under the radar during periods of dramatic institutional reconfiguration. We illustrate how the changing articulations of power between the different local actors influence and are influenced by the successes and failures of formal, institutionalized political democratization. Tensions, competition, and confrontations in national debates have direct consequences on the transition process at the local level, including nominating special delegations and governors, in addition to organizing local elections (or failing to do so). In their turn, the intended and unintended consequences of these strategies fuel the competition (and at times collaboration) between local actors who already have goals and strategies of their own in relation to the local population. The political and ideological tensions prevailing in national politics are thus reinterpreted locally in relation to concrete dilemmas and opportunities, thereby mobilizing local constituencies for or against national elites. In Tunisia, while the formal process of institutionalization of the democratic transition seemed relatively straightforward (even taking into account the frictions between Islamists and secularists), the local mechanisms of political and institutional transformation remained far more ad hoc, and even anarchic, in the years that followed the 2011 revolution. Locally, more than an ideological struggle between Islamists and secularists, the opposition between different social and political actors centered on a contest to control local institutions; however, without elections, no side could claim legitimacy. Equally, the apparent resilience of some authoritarian practices, like the use of special delegations and pressures to change the composition of local councils, was often less an attempt by Ennahda to control the system than a pragmatic choice made in an unstable environment. The different outcomes of the state pressures to change the composition of the councils in different municipalities after the 2011 elections illustrate the continuing practice of political compromise in situations where the local legitimacy of all the actors involved remained uncertain. However, as long as local democracy is not formalized through electoral processes, authoritarian practices persist and the resistance that they generate deepens.
In this context, center-periphery tensions that initially centered on socioeconomic development were increasingly reinterpreted in more political terms. Local politics fed into national processes of contestation as opposition actors blamed the Islamist-led government for everything that could go wrong locally. Beyond the political rhetoric, however, it is clear that the initial revolutionary experiments with democratic power in Tunisian municipalities during the transitional period were not put to the best use by citizens and local actors. The limited coordinated effort at good governance that resulted, among local actors and between the center and the periphery, is linked to the lack of experience of many of the new actors (and even some of the old civil society activists) who gained prominence during the revolution. This situation created a vicious circle of inefficiency in which each participant (the citizenry, councils, civil servants, and the central government) willingly or unwillingly contributed to make the action of the others even less effective, thereby producing a general situation (and perception) of decline of political authority. Although the Tunisian process of democratic consolidation is undoubtedly still moving ahead, the experiments with local democracy that could have facilitated the transition have been turned into a series of hindrances and resistances. It will now require more political vision and skills from all the social and political actors concerned to turn local governance into an asset for democracy in Tunisia.
